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During the 1950's, the principle of Totality emerged as an important
tool in medical ethics for evaluating the appropriateness of surgical
mutilation. One of the early issues ethicists used the principle to
address was prophylactic surgery, usually elective tonsillectomies
and elective or incidental appendectomies. An ethical consensus
emerged that, while neither an elective tonsillectomy nor an elective
appendectomy was justified, an incidental appendectomy was
pennissible. A directive allowing the latter can be found in the 1954
Code of Medical Ethics for Catholic Hospitals, I the forerunner of the
present day Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health
Services. Since that time, discussions of prophylactic surgery have
all but disappeared from the ethical literature, and no subsequent
editions of the ERD contain any directive on the topic. Today, the
issue of prophylactic surgery is once again emerging as a topic
among ethicists and medical staff. The discovery that female carriers
of BRCAJ and BRCA2 genn-line mutation may be at greater risk for
breast and ovarian cancer2 has some physicians and women
questioning whether prophylactic surgery to reduce that risk,
specifically a mastectomy or a tubal ligation, can be ethically
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appropriate. This is especially true with ovarian cancer due to the
minimal mutilation entailed with a tubal ligation as compared to the
mastectomy to reduce the risk of breast cancer. Both research and
strong anecdotal evidence suggest that a tubal ligation may
significantly reduce the risk of ovarian cancer by preventing
exposure of the epithelium to steroid-rich follicular fluid and
reducing circulating levels of pituitary gonadotropins. 3
The connection between ovarian cancer and a surgical
prophylactic for ovarian cancer, what I will refer to throughout as
SPOC, is significant. Approximately 2% of all women will be
diagnosed with ovarian cancer in their lifetime. Although less
common than some other forms of cancer in women, 4 ovarian
cancer is a particularly dangerous form. 5 Less than 40% of those
women diagnosed with it will survive five years after that diagnosis. 6
There are approximately 120,000 deaths related to ovarian cancer
each year. To emphasize the seriousness of this disease, 20,000
people die each year from the flu, a figure that constitutes a health
epidemic. In addition to the morbidity related to the disease, there
are serious issues related to its treatment. Despite a variety of
interventions for ovarian cancer, none has been shown to be
singularly effective. In addition to their unproved effectiveness, each
treatment entails its own morbidity.7
Clearly, ovarian cancer poses a serious health risk to all
women, and especially those who are carriers of BRCAl and BRCA2
germ-line mutation. The ability to reduce the risk of this difficult
and dangerous cancer with prophylactic surgery will have a
profoundly beneficial impact on the lives of many women.
There are essentially two ethical issues related to SPOC that
emerge within the Catholic tradition that must be addressed. First,
SPOC entails surgical mutilation. It must, therefore, be justified
according to the conditions ofthe principle of Totality. As suggested
above, however, there is not a great deal of literature discussing
Totality and prophylactic surgery, and this is limited to
tonsillectomies and appendectomies. This may be due to the fact
that there have been relatively few opportunities when surgery was
of prophylactic value as compared to its use for therapeutic or
diagnostic use. Further, recent literature on Totality has tended to
focus on theoretical questions, such as what Pius XII meant by the
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concept of the total good of the person, or the correct interpretation
of ST II-II q. 65, a. 1, rather than on its application to specific
surgical interventions. 8 To ask whether SPOC is permissible
according to Totality is, in many ways, to raise a new ethical
question.
Second, SPOC entails the ligation of the fallopian tube.
SPOC not only prevents exposure of the epithelium to steroid-rich
follicular fluid and reduces circulating levels of pituitary
gonadotropins. It also results in the obstruction of that sperm and
ovum transport necessary for fertilization.
As a sterilizing
procedure, SPOC cannot be justified simply on the basis of the total
good of the person. Direct sterilization, even for the health and wellbeing of the individual, cannot be licitly performed in a Catholic
health care facility.9 SPOC interventions will only be permissible if
the sterilization is an unintended effect of a licit medical procedure.
It is therefore necessary that the conditions of Double Effect be met
before SPOC can be judged as a permissible medical procedure.
Given these ethical concerns, the place of SPOC within
Catholic health care is at best uncertain. The risks and dangers of
ovarian cancer and its treatment as well as the reported reduction in
risk through SPOC suggest, however, that its place be investigated.
Is it permissible to perform the procedure in a Catholic health care
facility? Maya Catholic physician perform SPOC? Maya Catholic
woman request SPOC? Mayan IRB at a Catholic health care
institution approve a SPOC protocol? It is the purpose of this work
to investigate these questions by examining the procedure within the
context of both the principles of Totality and Double Effect. This
will be followed by concluding remarks intended to invite further
debate. It is my hope that, as with past questions of prophylactic
surgery, a consensus may begin to emerge as to the place of SPOC
within the Catholic health care tradition.
SPOC and the Principle of Totality

The principle of Totality has become such a part of medical
ethics that it is rarely discussed in contemporary literature to the
degree that it was earlier in the tradition. Summary statements with a
brief history are common today, and deemed sufficient. 1o This is
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understandable. As principles become better understood there is less
controversy in their application and less need for discussion. SPOC,
however, entails at least four issues that may suggest controversy:
(1) the mutilation is for a prophylactic, rather than curative, purpose,
(2) it will be difficult to detennine that the good end is
commensurate to the mutilation required to achieve it, and, finally,
SPOC involves a (3) healthy and (4) reproductive organ. Each of
these potential difficulties will be addressed here.
Before doing so, a brief word should be said about Totality in
ll
general. The principle of Totality, rooted in the work of Aquinas ,
has come to be understood within the tradition as meaning that true
bodily "parts" exist not for themselves, but for the sake of the whole.
As a result, bodily "parts", meaning those organs that do not have
ends outside the whole - seemingly excluding the reproductive
organs - may be sacrificed for the sake of the whole when there is a
proportionately grave or commensurate reason for doing so. That is,
there must be a sufficiently grave threat to the person such that a
commensurate relationshir exists between the good to be gained and
the mutilation caused. I
One important contributor to the
development of the principle within the tradition, Gerald Kelly, S.1.,
elaborates on this point. Kelly makes it clear that the degree of
mutilation entailed in surgery is not a decisive element in decision
making. As long as there is a commensurate relationship between
the mutilation and the good end, the degree of mutilation may be
great or slight. What is critical in moral evaluation is the presence of
a proportionately grave reason for inflicting the mutilation. 13 This is
important to keep in mind. The central ethical element of Totality is
the judgment that the mutilation is commensurate to the good end to
be achieved. Generally, this judgment requires an examination of
the threat to the whole person and the degree and effect of the
mutilation required to respond to this threat.

(1.) Prophylactic Mutilation

In addressing the first issue, it needs to be made explicit that
surgical mutilation is not limited to those cases where it will serve to
cure or manage a present pathology. Totality has also been used to
80
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r justifY non-therapeutic physical mutilation such as that found in

,

experimentation l4 , and, important for this discussion, as a
prophylactic against some possible future disease.
Explicitly
referring to prophylactic mutilation, Pius XII stated:
Because he is not a user and not a proprietor, an individual does
not have unlimited power to destroy or mutilate his body or its
functions. Nevertheless, by virtue of the principle of totality and
the right to use the services of the organism as a whole, each
person can permit individual parts to be destroyed or mutilated
when the good of the whole requires it. Further, he may do so to
the extent necessary. This may be done to ensure life, as well as
to avoid or, naturally, repair serious and lasting damage that
cannot otherwise be avoided or repaired. 15
(Emphasis added)

Ethical discussion of prophylactic surgery, some of which
will be cited here, shows clearly that the phrases "to ensure" (pour
assurer) and "to avoid" (pour eviler), are understood to refer to
prophylactic mutilation in the strict sense. Acceptance of certain
clinical practices also points to this fact. Immunization is a common
example of a prophylactic mutilation held to be commensurate to a
good end. The removal of adenoids during a tonsillectomy or the
removal of an appendix during abdominal surgery are other, less
common instances of a surgical prophylactic that have been justified
using Totality. In some medical interventions, the mutilation
entailed is easily regarded as commensurate to the good end. In the
absence of actual harm, however, it can be difficult to determine
whether a proportionately grave reason exists to perform the surgery.
Nevertheless, such mutilation is allowed by Totality when there is a
proportionately grave reason.
(2.) Determining Commensurate Reason
There is always a degree of uncertainty in making the
jUdgment of commensurate reason when using the principle of
Totality. An elderly person with multiple and serious health
difficulties may judge that the amputation of a leg is not
commensurate to the prevention of gangrene poisoning, whereas a
August, 1998

81

younger person in otherwise good health may judge the loss of a
limb as commensurate. In certain circumstances, either of these
judgments could change. The judgment of commensurate reason is
not always self-evident, nor universally agreed upon. This is
especially true in cases of prophylactic surgery when one must take
into account not only the seriousness of the pathology, but also the
degree of probability or likelihood that the pathology will come to
pass.
One excellent example of the ambiguity in making this
judgment concerns the question of a prophylactic tonsillectomy.
Charles McFadden, O.S.A., wrote, "it is evident that ordinarily there
is no moral justification for the removal of healthy tonsils." 16 The
reason, he explained, is because their removal in a moment of
pathological crisis is · relatively simple. However, there might be
situations in which one could justify their prophylactic removal in
light of the fact that a tonsillectomy entails only minimal risk to the
patient. He gives the example of a poor family of five children who
is moving to a new state, and a physician who is willing to perform
the procedure free of charge before they move, in anticipation of the
possibility of incurring the expense later. Others objected to this
conclusion. Kelly is one example, maintaining that because the
tonsils are easily removed when necessary, removing them without
medical indication "creates risk without proportionate cause." 17
This lack of certainty does not mean that Totality cannot
allow mutilation, either for cure or for prophylaxis. Commensurate
reason need not be immediately self-evident or certain. To make
these types of judgments, the tradition relies on probable certitude. 18
Probable certitude simply means that it is reasonable to make the
judgment that there is a commensurate relationship between the good
end and the surgical mutilation. 19 This is true even if another
reasonably judges otherwise?O Probable certitude rooted in a
reasonable judgement that the good outweighs the harm is sufficient
within the moral tradition to allow surgical mutilation. This point is
illustrated clearly by the lack of precise analysis in the literature
discussing prophylactic mutilations. 21
The determination of
commensurate reason is one that conforms to a reasonable judgment,
not a precise methodology.22
It must be noted that as a consensus emerges regarding a
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judgment of commensurate reason in specific situations, it can
become difficult or even impossible to reasonably judge otherwise.
This is what happened in the case of an elective tonsillectomy. A
medical and ethical consensus emerged that it was not reasonable to
judge that the procedure entailed a commensurate good. In the
absence of such a consensus, however, all that the tradition requires
in the application of totality is the reasonable judgment that a
proportionally grave reason exists.
(3.) Mutilation of Healthy Organs
A third issue concerns the mutilation of healthy organs.
Totality does not restrict mutilation to unhealthy organs, or to organs
that are in immediate danger of becoming pathological. Healthy
organs may be mutilated for the good of the whole whenever their
functioning poses a physical risk to the person. In a 1953 address,
Pius XII stated that the decisive element of Totality was not that the
organ which is removed or rendered nonfunctional is itself diseased.
Rather, the decisive element is that the preservation of that organ or
its functioning poses a direct or indirect threat to the body as a
whole. 23 When, by its function, a healthy organ exercises a harmful
effect on the body and the removal of that organ or the suppression
of its function may prove to be of benefit, that organ may be
removed or rendered nonfunctional. This applies, and here the
fourth issue is addressed, to the reproductive organs as well.
(4.) The Mutilation of Reproductive Organs
Direct sterilization is prohibited within the tradition. This is
because only those organs which do not have an end outside the
whole person may be mutilated for the sake of the person. The
reproductive organs are not understood to function for the direct,
physical well being of the person, but rather for the end of
procreating another being. They therefore cannot, as seen above,
generally be mutilated for the good of the whole. This does not
mean that they may never be mutilated for the sake of the whole.
Reproductive organs may be mutilated for the sake of the whole
person as long as it is the general biological functioning of those
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organs which affects or threatens the whole, and not their
reproductive functioning.
For example, the tradition holds that healthy testicles may be
removed if the production of testosterone poses a health risk to a
man with cancer.24 The production of testosterone is necessary for
procreation, but in this case it is the testosterone by itself, apart from
its reproductive role, which poses a threat to the person. On the
other hand, if pregnancy were to pose a health risk to a woman with
hypertension, it would not be permitted to mutilate the reproductive
system. In this latter case, it is pregnancy, the reproductive
25
functioning of the reproductive organs, that poses a health threat.
Totality and SPOC

Is it possible to make the reasonable judgment that, in light of
the degree of risk and morbidity associated with ovarian cancer and
its management, and the degree of mutilation entailed in SPOC, there
can be a commensurate reason to permit the procedure according to
Totality? Is it possible that both a medical and ethical consensus
may emerge that such is the case? The consensus that has emerged
within the tradition regarding an incidental appendectomy offers a
helpful analogy.
Kelly offered what became the standard use of Totality for a
discussion of the appropriateness of the incidental appendectomy.
He asserted that, (a) when the abdomen was open for some other
legitimate reason, (b) because the appendix served no significant role
in the functional integrity of the body, and (c) if the appendectomy
would not increase the risk of the operation or add a notable
inconvenience in convalescence, "there is no moral objection to
incidental appendectomy,,26 Using similar arguments, Thomas
O'Donnell agreed?7 It should be pointed out that in stating his
conclusion, Kelly does not require that the appendix be pathological.
In fact, he explicitly rejected the argument of Nicholas Lohkamp
that a purely prophylactic surgery was never permissible. Lohkamp
stated that there must be at least the probability that the pathology is
already present in some latent or potential way for the incidental
appendectomy to be permissible. 28 Kelly comments that this is an
interesting theory, and acknowledges that "[i]t may well be that most
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apparently healthy appendices are already somewhat diseased." But,
"this is not a requisite either morally or medically, for justifying
incidental appendectomy.,,29 According to the tradition, it is
sufficient that there be merely a risk to the health of the person, a risk
which he does not specify beyond the acknowledging that "this is
fairly routine practice in good hospitals. ,,30 All that is necessary to
justify prophylactic surgery according to Totality is the reasonable
judgment that the risks of the procedure, the importance of the organ
and the mutilation and physical loss entailed are commensurate to
the elimination of risk.
Kelly incorporated this conclusion in his Code of Medical
Ethics, written on behalf of the Catholic Hospital Association. It can
also be found in his Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic
Hospitals (Directive 41), approved by the Bishops of the United
States "as the official medical code subject to the approval of the
authorities for use in their dioceses.,,31 This directive was deleted
during draft revisions to the ERD in 1970, and is not found in the
final edition that was approved in 1971. Similarly, it is not found in
the recently promulgated 1994 edition. I have been unable to
determine the exact circumstances of the deletion. It appears,
though, that there is no ethical discussion of the incidental
appendectomy in the literature appearing after the time of the
publication of Kelly's Medico Moral Problems. This may be seen as
indicative of a consensus of ethical agreement that the performance
of an incidental appendectomy, and the rationale to explain it, is
consistent with the tradition's understanding of Totality.32
From the above, I believe it can be confidently concluded that
the tradition's use of Totality allows prophylactic surgery in those
cases where there is a risk to the health of the person posed by the
functioning of a healthy organ, and when it is reasonable to judge
that there is a commensurability between the mutilation and the
reduction or elimination of that risk. From this, I will propose that
SPOC can be reasonably judged to be permissible in a way similar to
the judgment that an incidental appendectomy is permissible. I will
further suggest that, although a consensus exists that an elective
appendectomy is not permissible, SPOC need not be restricted to
being an incidental procedure. Ovarian cancer clearly poses a more
significant health risk than appendicitis, even if the incidence is
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lower. Approximately 7% of the population will experience an
episode of acute appendicitis requiring an appendectomy. This
compares to 2% of the female population being at risk with ovarian
cancer. However, it must be kept in mind that appendicitis is
generally completely resolved at the time of the episode. Ovarian
cancer cannot be resolved at the time of diagnosis, and its
management is uncertain and entails significant morbidity. Death
and serious complications due to appendicitis are relatively
uncommon, yet 60% of those diagnosed with ovarian cancer will die
within four years of diagnosis. Also, SPOC, because it entails a
relatively simple procedure involving the fallopian tubes, can be
performed as an elective procedure as laparoscopic surgery under a
general or local anesthesia, or incidentally as part of a cesarian or
other abdominal surgery. This is not the case with a prophylactic
appendectomy, which ethical consensus holds can only be justified
when performed incidentally due to the risks entailed. The overall
physical mutilation required for SPOC is smaller than that required
by an appendectomy, and in some cases may be reversible.
I will propose, then, that the mutilation and the reduction in
risk provided by SPOC with the incidence of ovarian cancer and its
attendant morbidity, as well as the morbidity of its treatment makes
it reasonable to conclude that SPOC can be justified according to
It still remains, however, to address the . issue of
Totality.
sterilization as an effect of SPOC. This will be done through a
discussion of the four conditions of the Principle of Double Effect.
SPOC and the Principle of Double Effect

33

The first condition of the PDE holds that the end or purpose
of the procedure must be good. Here, there is no ethical difficulty
with intending the preservation of a woman's health as an end. The
tradition has long held that the health and well-being of the person is
a good end that may be intended as an end. Indeed, right
stewardship over the body requires one to intend health and wellbeing as an end. 34
The second condition holds that the procedure must be
morally good or indifferent. To determine this, it is necessary to
specify the moral object of the procedure. In doing so, it should be
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noted that there are two immediate effects of SPOC. One effect is
the prevention of exposure by the epithelium to steroid-rich follicular
fluid and the reduction of circulating levels of pituitary
gonadotropins. A second effect is the prevention of sperm and ovum
transport through the fallopian tube. These are two distinct
biological effects that are related to each other by the fact that each
requires a patent fallopian tube. The fallopian tube serves as a
transport medium in two different and distinct biological events,35
and hence its mutilation will result in two distinct biological effects.
It is the first effect that reduces the risk of ovarian cancer. It is
therefore this effect which lies within the intention (ex intentione) as
the moral object of SPOC. Sterilization is not the sole immediate
effect of SPoc. It is a second effect which, when SPOC is
performed as a prophylactic against ovarian cancer, lies outside the
intention (praeter intentionem). Performed for the purpose of
preventing ovarian cancer, SPOC can rightly be said to have a
morally good or at least neutral object, and hence is a morally
permissible procedure.
The third condition holds that the good effect must not flow
from the evil effect. Although similar, this condition is distinct from
the second. Even if the procedure is good in itself, it is important to
determine that the evil effect of that procedure is not the means to a
good end. As already noted in the above discussion of the second
condition, both effects flow immediately from the procedure and
independently of each other.
This biological independence
demonstrates that sterilization is neither the object of the act nor the
cause or means of the good end. Stated differently, the effect of
sterilization is not a means for which SPOC is performed. It is an
effect in spite of which SPOC is performed. Preventing pregnancy
will not reduce the risk of ovarian cancer.36
The fourth condition requires that there be a commensurate
reason for causing the unintended effect of a good act. It is one thing
to say that the mutilation entailed in SPOC is commensurate to the
prevention of ovarian cancer. It must still be determined that this
good end is commensurate to the effect of sterilization. Not only
must there be a commensurate reason to mutilate the fallopian tube.
There must also be a commensurate reason for bringing about the
unintended sterilization.
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Health and well-being have consistently been understood
within the tradition as being commensurate to the mutilation of the
reproductive faculty when pathology is present. 37 A caution must be
raised here, however, because SPOC pertains to a situation in which
there is no pathology present. Instead, it is the risk of a pathology
that is of concern. Given the fact that ovarian cancer is a particularly
dangerous form of cancer responsible for 120,000 deaths each year,
however, it is possible to propose that sterilization as an effect of
preventing a pathology may be understood to be analogous to the
sterilization that results from treating a pathology. I propose that it is
reasonable to conclude that the good end of significantly reducing
the risk of a pathology like ovarian cancer is commensurate to the
unintended effect of sterilization. There is no certain answer in this
case. There is seldom absolute certainty in making a judgment
regarding the presence of commensurate reason in this fourth
condition of PDE, just as there is often a lack of absolute certitude in
making a judgment of commensurate reason with Totality. Still, the
prudent person, weighing the facts of the case, might conclude that it
is reasonable to judge that a commensurate reason exists for causing
sterilization in a prophylactic procedure such as SPOC. The
reasonableness of this judgment can be strengthened if the moral
significance of that effect is lessened. The possibility of this is
rooted in the Church's teachings on Natural Family Planning.
The moral tradition has understood that there are legitimate
motives for a decision to positively exclude the good of procreation
from the conjugal relationship. Among these are reasons of health,
the desire to avoid passing on a genetic anomaly, economic
considerations and social mission. When conditions such as these
are present, a couple may limit the number of children they will bear
as long as in doing so they do not directly intend to impede the
procreative end of the sexual act. 38 When there are serious reasons
for positively excluding the procreative end from the sexual act, the
unintended loss of the reproductive function resulting from a medical
intervention directed toward some disease may be more readily
judged as being commensurate to a good end. That is, if a couple
makes a positive decision not to bear children, and this decision is
made with an honorable motive, the unintended loss of fertility that
results from some medical procedure either person might have is less
88
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grave from a moral perspective than if the couple simply did not
want any children in the first place. In both cases the loss of fertility
may be unintended, but the commensurate reason for allowing that
unintended effect is different. An example can be found going back
to Pius XII's justification of castration in the case of cancer.39 In the
case of a man who, with his wife, has determined not to bear further
children due to the presence of a genetic anomaly, the loss of the
reproductive function due to castration is less morally grave and thus
more readily justified than in the case of a man who has no reason
not to procreate and most likely would procreate were it not for the
unintended effect of the castration. This is perhaps not the best
example, for in both cases the unintended loss of fertility is justified.
Nevertheless, the point should be clear that the moral justification in
both cases is different. Perhaps a better but admittedly self-serving
example is SPOC itself. For a woman who will no longer bear
children due to age or health, the loss of fertility is more readily
justified than for a young woman who has not borne any children and
who has no particular reason why she would not have any. In this
case, the risk of ovarian cancer is such that it would be difficult to
see how the unintended loss of fertility could be justified as being
commensurate to the good end
Conclusion

SPOC, performed for the good end of health, has as its moral
object the prevention of exposure of the epithelium to steroid-rich
follicular fluid and the reduction of circulating levels of pituitary
gonadotropins. Sterilization results as an unintended effect that is
not the cause of the good end. As such, SPOC meets the first three
conditions of Double Effect and may be described as a permissible
prophylactic surgical intervention. Before SPOC may be performed
in any given case, however, both the requirements of Totality and the
fourth condition of PDE must be satisfied . . It must be reasonable to
judge that both the mutilation entailed and the effect of sterilization
that results are commensurate to the good end of significantly
reducing the risk of a dangerous cancer.
With regard to commensurate reason and Totality, I propose
that the incidence and morbidity of ovarian cancer and its
August, 1998

89

management, seen within the context of the significant reduction in
risk, make it reasonable to conclude that the minor mutilation
involved in SPOC is commensurate. The use of surgery as a
prophylactic against ovarian cancer may be said to be justified by
Totality. This is especially true when SPOC is perfonned as an
incidental rather than · elective procedure.
In light of the ·
comparatively less mutilation entailed in SPOC as compared to an
appendectomy and the fact that SPOC can be done as a laparoscopic
procedure in an outpatient setting, this restriction to incidental use
may not be necessary with SPOC. Some will disagree with the
reasonableness of either or both of these judgments. In the absence
of a consensus, which this work seeks to help shape, it is
nevertheless possible to hold that this conclusion is probable
With regard to the fourth condition of the PDE, the tradition
would generally hold that the good end of health is commensurate to
the unintended effect of sterilization. This is especially the case
when there is some reason, such as those articulated by Pius XII,
which allows a couple to positively exclude the procreative good.
Hence, it seems reasonable to judge that the loss of fertility entailed
in SPOC is allowed for a commensurate reason. The reasonableness
of this conclusion can be strengthened in those instances when the
moral significance of the loss of fertility is mitigated by some serious
reason. This would not appear to be a necessary restriction, but
rather a prudent application in light of the fact that the procedure is
prophylactic rather than curative.
I will tentatively conclude here that SPOC is not in any way
prohibited by the tradition as a whole, or by any specific directive of
the ERD.40 It would seem that SPOC may be perfonned in a
Catholic facility as part of a research protocol to confinn its
prophylactic value, or simply at the request of a patient. Similarly, a
Catholic woman is free to request SPOC of her physician, and a
Catholic physician or nurse is free to perfonn or assist in SPOC in a
non-Catholic facility. In light of the fact that the judgment regarding
a commensurate reason in both Totality and the fourth condition of
the PDE is fonned with probable certitude for which a consensus
does not yet exist, hospital policies may want to limit the general use
of SPOC to situations wherein it can be perfonned concurrent with
an otherwise medically indicated surgical procedure, and when there
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is some reason to avoid future procreation. Nevertheless, policies
should not be closed to the possibility that in some hospital settings
and under some circumstances SP~C can be permissible outside the
context of some other surgery or serious reason to exclude
procreation.
Using Kelly's expression regarding elective
appendectomies, there can be special cases in which this use of
sP~c would seem probable.41 These can be addressed on a case by
case basis until such time as a consensus begins to emerge regarding
this judgment.
This conclusion is based on what appear to this author to be
reasonable judgments of what constitutes a commensurate reason for
performing SP~C. The reasonableness of this judgment depends on
both ethical and medical information. It is necessary, as ethicists
seek to build a consensus, that policies that allow SP~C and
decisions of conscience which inform individuals' behaviors be
continually reviewed. Medical information may come to light that
challenges or strengthens the judgments put forth here. It must be
kept in mind that changes in the medical information may make
SP~C more easily justified, less easily justified, or even prohibited. 42
In the meantime, it seems reasonable to conclude that SP~C is a
generally permissible prophylactic procedure for ovarian cancer. I
invite other ethicists to join me in this discussion so that a clearer
consensus may emerge in a manner similar to the consensus that now
informs Catholic health care's acceptance of the incidental
appendectomy.
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